03 March 2011

Kerouac's Thirty Essentials for Spontaneous Prose



1. Scribbled secret notebooks, and wild typewritten pages, for yr own joy
2. Submissive to everything, open, listening
3. Try never get drunk outside yr own house
4. Be in love with yr life
5. Something that you feel will find its own form
6. Be crazy dumbsaint of the mind
7. Blow as deep as you want to blow
8. Write what you want bottomless from bottom of the mind
9. The unspeakable visions of the individual
10. No time for poetry but exactly what is
11. Visionary tics shivering in the chest
12. In tranced fixation dreaming upon object before you
13. Remove literary, grammatical and syntactical inhibition
14. Like Proust be an old teahead of time
15. Telling the true story of the world in interior monolog
16. The jewel center of interest is the eye within the eye
17. Write in recollection and amazement for yourself
18. Work from pithy middle eye out, swimming in language sea
19. Accept loss forever
20. Believe in the holy contour of life
21. Struggle to sketch the flow that already exists intact in mind
22. Don't think of words when you stop but to see picture better
23. Keep track of every day the date emblazoned in yr morning
24. No fear or shame in the dignity of yr experience, language & knowledge
25. Write for the world to read and see yr exact pictures of it
26. Bookmovie is the movie in words, the visual American form
27. In praise of Character in the Bleak inhuman Loneliness
28. Composing wild, undisciplined, pure, coming in from under, crazier the better
29. You're a Genius all the time
30. Writer-Director of Earthly movies Sponsored & Angeled in Heaven

Every writer should know these. But some are more essential than others.

Be in love with your life

I think one of my philosophies has always been that it's easier to write when you have a wealth of experiences to pull from. Maybe it was my way of justifying a perceived sense of inferiority when I started hanging out with people who had received undergrad degrees in English or lit. (Telling myself Hemingway was great because of the life he lived rather than the degrees he'd received.)

Even if it's not true, it's a hell of a good way to live. Making a life for yourself rather than living what was given to you. Not sure if I've succeeded, but I'm working on it. Music, travel, friends, food and drink, sipping Jameson on my front porch and strumming my guitar, watching the sun rise over the Atlantic or the Alps or the Alleghenies. I've always believed I had to have the life I wanted before I ever got published and became wildly successful. Because no matter what, I'll always have a life I love.

Remove literary, grammatical and syntactical inhibition

Haiku, lyrics, photo captions, texts. All of these are acceptable. Who says it all has to be straight prose?

Believe in the holy contour of life

Ashes to ashes, dust to dust. That's all we really are. Accept and live like you know you're not going to see tomorrow.

You're a Genius all the time

Damn straight, I am. It's just that not everybody's going to realize it. But they will. Hell, yeah, they will.

01 March 2011

THE MUSIC AND PRESTON BLACK The Clash, Bond's International Casino, New York, NY, June 13, 1981


Here's another show from The Clash's stand at Bond's. Kind of pulled it at random out of a folder and had it playing while I finished a final draft on my novel.

I know I went into some of this a little before, but Joe Strummer really gives me what I need to get through some shitty times. This business of publishing books is merciless--nobody ever told me otherwise. But listening to some of these shows reminds me why I'm doing it. I'm working on something I believe in, and I'm not going to wait for a gatekeeper to tell me when it's alright to put it out there. If I could bottle just a little of the intensity Joe had for his music...

I've been writing for ten years. For the first five I didn't have a clue. Then I learned about agents and querying and marketing and writing didn't feel as fun. But the changing market makes it all very exciting for me again. I think it's the idea of putting out what I want, when I want without waiting for a marketing department to approve it. Writing this way approximates the way The Clash released their music--on their own terms, even if they lost money. That's why they're the only band that matters, and always will be.

Here's the setlist from http://sugarmegs.org/

The Clash
Bonds International Casino
Times Square, New York (Evening Show)
June 13th 1981

Trade > CDR > EAC > WAV > Traders Little Helper > FLAC

Disc 1

London Calling
Safe European Home
The Leader
Train in Vain
White Man in Ham Palais
Radio Clash
Corner Soul
Guns of Brixton
The Call Up
Bankrobber
Complete Control
Lightning Strikes
Ivan Meets GI Joe
Charlie Don't Surf
Magnificent 7
Broadway


Disc 2

Somebody Got Murdered
Police and Thieves
Clampdown
Career Opportunities
Street Parade
One More Time
Pressure Drop
Washington Bullets
Armagideon Time
Janie Jones
New York Burns
Junco Partner
Brand New Cadilliac
White Riot

Download here: http://www.archive.org/serve/Clash1981-06-13EveningBondsInternationalCasinoNYC/Clash1981-06-13EveningBondsInternationalCasinoNYC.wma

11 February 2011

The E-Book Royalty Mess: An Interim Fix

The E-Book Royalty Mess: An Interim Fix

February 11, 2011. To mark the one-year anniversary of the Great Blackout, Amazon's weeklong shut down of e-commerce for nearly all of Macmillan's titles, we're sending out a series of alerts on the state of e-books, authorship, and publishing. The first installment ("How Apple Saved Barnes & Noble. Probably.") discussed the outcome, of that battle, which introduced a modicum of competition into the distribution of e-books. The second, ("E-Book Royalty Math: The House Always Wins") took up the long-simmering e-royalty debate, and showed that publishers generally do significantly better on e-book sales than on hardcover sales, while authors always do worse.

Today, we look at the implications of that disparity, and suggest an interim solution to minimize the harm to authors.

Negotiating a publishing contract is frequently contentious, but authors have long been able to take comfort in this: once the contract is signed, the interests of the author and the publisher are largely aligned. If the publisher works to maximize its revenues, it will necessarily work to maximize the author's royalties. This is the heart of the traditional bargain, whereby the author licenses the publisher long-term, exclusive book rights in the world's largest book market in exchange for an advance and the promise of diligently working to the joint benefit of author and publisher.

Now, for the first time, publishers have strong incentives to work against the author's interests.

As we discussed in our last alert, authors and publishers have traditionally acted as equal partners, splitting the net proceeds from book sales. Most sublicenses, for example, provide for a fifty-fifty split of proceeds, and the standard hardcover trade book royalty -- 15% of the retail price -- represented half of the net proceeds from selling the book when the standard was established.* But trade book publishers currently offer e-book royalties at precisely half what the terms of a traditional proceeds-sharing arrangement would dictate -- paying just 25% of net income on e-book sales. That's why the shift from hardcover to e-book sales is a win for publishers, a loss for authors.

The Pushback

The publisher's standard reply to this -- which we heard yet again after last week's alert -- is a muddle, conflating fixed costs with variable costs. Let's address that before we move on.

For any book, a publisher has two types of fixed costs: those attributable to the publisher's operations as a whole (office overhead, investments in infrastructure, etc.) and those attributable to the particular work (author's advance, editing, design). The variable costs for the book are the unit costs of production. These costs (print, paper, binding, returns, royalty) tell a publisher how much more it costs to get, say, 10,000 additional hardcover books to stores and sell them. The publisher's gross profit per unit (unit income minus unit costs) is the amount against which the author's royalties are traditionally and properly measured. With this sort of analysis, a publisher can compare the gross profitability per unit of, for example, a hardcover to a trade paperback edition.

Investments in technology change nothing. Publishers never argued, for example, that hardcover royalties needed to be cut when they began equipping their editorial and design staffs with expensive (at the time) personal computers, buying pricey computers and software for their designers, tying those computers together with ever-more-powerful Ethernet cables and routers, and hiring support staff to maintain it all. Publishers simply took their share of the gross profits from book sales and applied it to all of their costs, as they always have. What remains after deducting those costs is deemed the publisher's net profit. Similarly, authors take their share of the proceeds of their book sales and apply it to their overhead (food, clothing, shelter, and computer technology) and costs (their labor and out-of-pocket costs to write the manuscript). What remains is the author's net profit.

The proper question is this: how much better off is a publisher if it sells a book, print or digital, than it is if it doesn't? That is what we measured. We then compared that to the author's print and digital royalties per book.

Publisher's E-Gains + Author's E-Losses = E-Bias

Applying standard trade hardcover and e-book terms to Kathryn Stockett's "The Help," David Baldacci's "Hell's Corner," and Laura Hillenbrand's "Unbroken," we found that publishers do far better by selling e-books than hardcovers (realizing "e-gains" of 27% to 77%), while the authors do much worse (suffering "e-losses" of 17% to 39%). Publishers can't help being influenced by the gains; e-bias will inevitably drive their decisions.

Some simplified examples show how e-bias plays out in publishing decisions:

1. Promotional Bias. Assume a publisher is contemplating whether to invest a portion of a book's limited marketing budget in stimulating the sale of digital books (paying for featured placement in the Kindle or Nook stores, perhaps) or in encouraging print sales through a promotion at physical bookstores. Either way, the publisher expects the investment to boost sales by 1,000 copies. A sensible publisher would spend the money to promote digital books, pocketing an additional $1,570 to $4,170 on those sales compared to hardcover sales. Such a decision, however, would cost Ms. Stockett, Mr. Baldacci, and Ms. Hillenbrand $1,470, $1,570, and $670, respectively, in royalties.

2. Print-Run Bias. E-gains of 27% to 77% become irresistible when a publisher looks at risk-adjusted returns on investment, as any businessperson would. Once a book is typeset for print, the publisher must invest an additional $30,000 to have 10,000 hardcover books ready for sale, using the figures from our prior alert. Once the digital template is created and distributed to the major vendors, on the other hand, there is no additional cost to having the book ready for purchase by an unlimited number of customers. Even the encryption fee (50 cents per book, at most) isn't incurred until the reader purchases the book. In this environment a publisher is nearly certain to keep print runs as short as possible, risking unavailability at bookstores, in order to decrease overall risk and maximize the publisher's return on investment.

Publishers, in short, will work to increase e-book sales at the inevitable expense of hardcover sales, tilting more and more purchases toward e-books, and their lower royalties. Publishers, as sensible, profit-maximizing entities, will work against their authors' best interests.

An Interim Solution: Negotiate an E-Royalty Floor

This won't go on forever. Bargain basement e-royalty rates are largely a result of negotiating indifference. The current industry standards for e-royalties began to gel a decade or so ago, when there was no e-book market to speak of. Authors and agents weren't willing to walk away from publishing contracts over a royalty clause that had little effect on the author's earnings.

Once the digital market gets large enough, authors with strong sales records won't put up with this: they'll go where they'll once again be paid as full partners in the exploitation of their creative work. That day is fast approaching, and would probably be here already, were it not for a tripwire in the contracts of thousands of in-print books. That tripwire? If the publisher increases its e-royalty rates for a new book, the e-royalty rates of countless in-print books from that publisher will automatically match the new rate or be subject to renegotiation.

So, what's to be done in the meantime? Here's a solution that won't cascade through countless backlist books: soften the e-bias by eliminating the author's e-loss. That is, negotiate for an e-royalty floor tied to the prevailing print book royalty amount.

Turning again to our last alert for examples, here are the calculations of e-losses and e-gains without an e-royalty floor:

"The Help," by Kathryn Stockett
Author's Standard Royalty: $3.75 hardcover; $2.28 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = -39%
Publisher's Margin: $4.75 hardcover; $6.32 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = +33%

"Hell's Corner," by David Baldacci
Author's Standard Royalty: $4.20 hardcover; $2.63 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = -37%
Publisher's Margin: $5.80 hardcover; $7.37 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = +27%

"Unbroken," by Laura Hillenbrand
Author's Standard Royalty: $4.05 hardcover; $3.38 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = -17%
Publisher's Margin: $5.45 hardcover; $9.62 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = +77%

Here are the calculations with an e-royalty floor:

"The Help," by Kathryn Stockett
Author's Adjusted Royalty: $3.75 hardcover; $3.75 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = Zero
Publisher's Margin: $4.75 hardcover; $4.85 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = +2%

"Hell's Corner," by David Baldacci
Author's Adjusted Royalty: $4.20 hardcover; $4.20 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = Zero
Publisher's Margin: $5.80 hardcover; $5.80 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = Zero

"Unbroken," by Laura Hillenbrand
Author's Adjusted Royalty: $4.05 hardcover; $4.05 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = Zero
Publisher's Margin: $5.45 hardcover; $8.85 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = +62%

While this wouldn't restore authors to full partnership status in the sale of their work, it would prevent them from being harmed as publishers try to maximize their revenues. This is only an interim solution, however. In the long run, authors will demand to be restored to full partnership, and someone will give them that status.

Part 4 of this series will look at online piracy and book publishing.

--------------------------------

*A traditional industry rule of thumb was that the price of a hardcover should be five or six times the cost of production. (John P. Dessauer, Book Publishing: What It Is, What It Does. R.R. Bowker 1974, p. 92). To keep the math simple, let's assume that it's priced at five times the cost of production, that there are no returns, and that the bookseller pays the publisher 50% of the list price for the book. Of the 50% the publisher receives, subtract 20% for the cost of production (one-fifth the retail price) and the net proceeds are 30% of the retail list price. Split that in two, and one arrives at the author's standard hardcover royalty, 15% of the retail list price. (A current rule of thumb is that the cost of producing a hardcover is about 15% of the retail price, but the actual costs vary widely.)

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05 February 2011

Authors Guild on eBooks, Part 2: E-Book Royalty Math: The Big Tilt

You'd better open your doors because this is going to blow them right off. Feel free to Tweet or repost.

E-Book Royalty Math: The Big Tilt

To mark the one-year anniversary of the Great Blackout, Amazon's weeklong shut down of e-commerce for nearly all of Macmillan's titles, we’re sending out a series of alerts this week and next on the state of e-books, authorship, and publishing. The first installment (“How Apple Saved Barnes & Noble. Probably.”) discussed the outcome, one year later, of that battle. Today, we look at the e-royalty debate, which has been simmering for a while, but is likely to soon heat up as the e-book market grows.

E-book royalty rates for major trade publishers have coalesced, for the moment, at 25% of the publisher’s receipts. As we’ve pointed out previously, this is contrary to longstanding tradition in trade book publishing, in which authors and publishers effectively split the net proceeds of book sales (that's how the industry arrived at the standard hardcover royalty rate of 15% of list price). Among the ills of this radical pay cut is the distorting effect it has on publishers’ incentives: publishers generally do significantly better on e-book sales than they do on hardcover sales. Authors, on the other hand, always do worse.

How much better for the publisher and how much worse for the author? Here are examples of author’s royalties compared to publisher’s gross profit (income per copy minus expenses per copy), calculated using industry-standard contract terms:

“The Help,” by Kathryn Stockett
Author’s Standard Royalty: $3.75 hardcover; $2.28 e-book. Author’s E-Loss = -39%
Publisher’s Margin: $4.75 hardcover; $6.32 e-book. Publisher’s E-Gain = +33%

“Hell’s Corner,” by David Baldacci
Author's Standard Royalty: $4.20 hardcover; $2.63 e-book. Author’s E-Loss = -37%
Publisher’s Margin: $5.80 hardcover; $7.37 e-book. Publisher’s E-Gain = +27%

“Unbroken,” by Laura Hillenbrand
Author’s Standard Royalty: $4.05 hardcover; $3.38 e-book. Author’s E-Loss = -17%
Publisher’s Margin: $5.45 hardcover; $9.62 e-book. Publisher’s E-Gain = +77%

So, everything else being equal, publishers will naturally have a strong bias toward e-book sales. It certainly does wonders for cash flow: not only does the publisher net more, but the reduced royalty means that every time an e-book purchase displaces a hardcover purchase, the odds that the author’s advance will earn out -- and the publisher will have to cut a check for royalties -- diminishes. In more ways than one, the author’s e-loss is the publisher’s e-gain.

Inertia, unfortunately, is embedded in the contractual landscape. If the publisher were to offer more equitable e-royalties in new contracts, it would ripple through much of the publisher’s catalog: most major trade publishers have thousands of contracts that require an automatic adjustment or renegotiation of e-book royalties if the publisher starts offering better terms. (Some publishers finesse this issue when they amend older contracts, many of which allow e-royalty rates to quickly escalate to 40% of the publisher’s receipts. Amending old contracts to grant the publisher digital rights doesn’t trigger the automatic adjustment, in the publisher's view.) Given these substantial collateral costs, publishers will continue to strongly resist changes to their e-book royalties for new books.

Resistance, in the long run, will be futile. As the e-book market continues to grow, competitive pressures will almost certainly force publishers to share e-book proceeds fairly. Authors with clout simply won’t put up with junior partner status in an increasingly important market. New publishers are already willing to share fairly. Once one of those publishers has the capital to pay even a handful of authors meaningful advances, or a major trade publisher decides to take the plunge, the tipping point will likely be at hand.

In the meantime, what’s to be done? We’ll address that in our next installment in this series, on Monday.

Our assumptions and calculations for the figures above follow.

--------------------------------------------------------
Doing the Numbers: Hardcover

To keep things as simple as possible, we assumed that for hardcovers: (1) the publisher sells at an average 50% discount to the wholesaler or retailer (2) the royalty rate is 15% of list price (as it is for most hardcover books, after 10,000 units are sold), (3) the average marginal cost to manufacture the book and get it to the store is $3, and (4) the return rate is 25% (a handy number -- if one of four books produced is returned, then the $3 marginal cost of producing the book is spread over three other books, giving us a return cost of $1 per book). We also rounded up retail list price a few pennies to give us easy figures to work with.

“The Help,” by Kathryn Stockett has a hardcover retail list price of $25. The standard royalty (15% of list) would be $3.75. The publisher grosses $12.50 per book at a 50% discount. Subtract from that the author's royalty ($3.75), cost of production ($3), and cost of returns ($1), and the publisher nets $4.75 on the sale of a hardcover book.

“Hell’s Corner” by David Baldacci, has a retail list price is $28. The standard royalty is $4.20; the publisher's gross is $14. Subtract royalties ($4.20), production and return costs ($4), and the publisher nets $5.80.

“Unbroken,” by Laura Hillenbrand has a hardcover list price of $27. Standard royalties are $4.05. The publisher's gross is $13.50. Subtract royalties of $4.05 and production and return costs of $4, and the publisher nets $5.45.

Doing the Numbers: E-Book

E-book royalty rates are uniform among the major trade publishers, but pricing and discounting formulas fall into two camps: the reseller model favored by Amazon (Random House is the only large trade publisher using this model) and the agency model introduced by Apple a year ago. (See yesterday’s alert for more information on these models.)

Under the reseller model, the online bookseller pays 50% of the retail list price of the book to the publisher and sells the book at whatever price the bookseller chooses (for bestsellers, Amazon typically sells Random House e-books at a significant loss). Random House frequently prices the e-book at the same price as the hardcover until a paperback edition is available.

Under the agency model, the online bookseller pays 70% of the retail list price of the e-book to the publisher. The bookseller, acting as the publisher’s agent, sells the e-book at the price established by the publisher, but the publisher is constrained by agreement with Apple and others to set a price significantly below that for the hardcover version.

The unit costs to the publisher, under either model, are simply the author’s royalty and the encryption fee, for which we’ll use a generous 50 cents per unit.

Here’s the math:

“The Help” has an e-book list price of $13 and is sold under the agency model. Publisher grosses 70% of retail price, or $9.10. Author's royalty is 25% of publisher receipts, or $2.28. Publisher nets $6.32. ($9.10 minus $2.28 royalties and $0.50 encryption fee.)

“Hell’s Corner” is also sold under the agency model at a retail list price of $15 list price. Publisher grosses 70% of retail price, $10.50. Author's royalty is 25% of publisher receipts, or $2.63. Publisher nets $7.37. ($10.50 minus $2.63 royalties and $0.50 encryption fee.)

“Unbroken” is sold by Random House under the reseller model at a retail list price of $27. Publisher grosses $13.50 on the sale. Author’s royalty, at 25%, is $3.38. Random House nets $9.62. ($13.50 minus $3.38 royalties and $0.50 encryption fee.)

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04 February 2011

How Apple Saved Barnes & Noble. Probably.

Here's the text on an email I recieved from the Authors Guild this week:

How Apple Saved Barnes & Noble. Probably.

Happy blackout anniversary! Where were you when the lights went out? We're sending out a series of alerts this week and next that look at the state of e-books, authorship and publishing to mark the one-year anniversary of the Great Blackout, when Amazon attempted to protect its near complete dominance of the rapidly growing e-book market through a stunning, punitive act against a publisher that dared to challenge its terms. (To see our account of this showdown as it happened -- posted last Groundhog Day -- go to "The Right Battle at the Right Time.")

It was one year ago last Saturday that Amazon turned out the lights on nearly all of Macmillan's books, removing the "buy buttons" from the print and electronic editions of thousands of titles. Macmillan authors, many of whom had linked their websites to Amazon pages that were suddenly disabled and useless, found themselves cut off from readers who frequented the dominant online bookstore.

Amazon's stunning move was a preemptive strike, an attempt to keep Macmillan from going through with its plan to shift to an "agency model" for selling e-books. Macmillan, which immediately saw its online sales plummet, stood firm and prevailed: Amazon ended the blackout after a week.

The story of the blackout and its aftermath reveals much about the high-stakes device and format war that's reshaping the publishing industry. Last year's Amazon-Macmillan showdown was a critical battle in that war.

One Year Ago: Amazon's 90% E-Book Market Share

By last January, Amazon seemed destined to retain an overwhelming share of the e-book market. It then, by most accounts, commanded about 90% of the U.S. trade e-book market. Barnes & Noble had entered the game just two months before, launching the Nook in time, barely, for the critical holiday season. Few in the industry were optimistic about Barnes & Noble's e-book efforts, however.

Amazon's strategy, it seemed clear, was to leverage its formidable advantages -- including its dominance of the online print book market -- to all but lock up the e-book market. If it was successful, Amazon would control the equivalent of a vast online book club. Any publisher wanting to sell to the club would have to agree to Amazon's terms. This was an ugly prospect: book clubs tend to be resilient, but ultra low-margin enterprises for all involved, except the proprietor.

Amazon went all-in with the Kindle and its proprietary e-reading software. This commitment was most evident on Amazon's home page -- surely the most valuable retail space on the Internet -- on which it featured the Kindle nearly every day since its launch.

Amazon's most potent weapon in the e-book format and device war, however, was the strategy it deployed so effectively in its conquest of online bookselling: using its seemingly limitless financial resources to discount books at rates no competitor could long sustain. Amazon now pushed this tactic to a new level, routinely buying e-books at wholesale prices of $13 and $14 and immediately selling them at a loss, for $9.99. This not only built customer enthusiasm for the Kindle and e-books, but helped crush online and offline competitors that were selling physical books. Amazon could win the future as it finished off the past.

The prospects for Barnes & Noble in this environment were decidedly grim. Its net income had plummeted during the recession, falling 65% in two years. For Amazon, however, it was as if the Great Recession hadn't happened. Its revenues had grown 65% and its net income increased 72% over the prior two years. Its market capitalization, which had climbed past $55 billion (it stands at $77 billion today), towered over Barnes & Noble's $1 billion.

The e-book market, by all appearances, was for sale to the highest bidder -- the retailer willing and able to sell the most digital books at a loss. Barnes & Noble was in no shape to compete against Amazon in that game.

Then the game shifted.

Enter Apple

On Wednesday, January 27, 2010, Steve Jobs announced the launch of the iPad and the iBookstore.

Apple wouldn't sell e-books under the reseller model that Amazon had been using to lock down the market. (Under that model, the publisher sells e-books to a reseller at a discount of about 50%. The reseller can then sell the e-book at any price, constrained only by antitrust law and the reseller's ability to absorb losses.) Instead, Apple would sell e-books under the same "agency model" it used for iPhone apps. Under the agency model, Apple acts as the publisher's agent, selling e-books at the price established by the publisher and taking a 30% commission on each sale. To participate, a publisher would have to agree to a set of ceilings on e-book prices, generally $12.99 or $13.99 for new books. A publisher would also have to agree not to sell to others under more favorable terms.

If the agency model took hold, unfettered discounting of e-books would be out. Amazon would lose its ability to buy market share in a nascent, booming industry.

Five of the big six trade publishers (not Random House) allowed their logos to be displayed at Apple's iPad announcement. The next day, Thursday, Macmillan CEO John Sargent informed Amazon that it would be shifting to the agency model when the iPad was released. It appears that he was the first publisher to do so.

If there were any doubts about the stakes in this battle, they were erased the following day, when Amazon retaliated by removing the buy buttons from all Macmillan titles (with exceptions for textbooks and scholarly books, where Amazon faced stiff online competition). It removed the buy buttons from all editions -- not just the electronic version -- in an attempt to use its clout in the print book industry to enforce its preferred business model in the e-book industry.

Though the e-book market was growing fast, cutting off Macmillan and its authors from Amazon's print book market -- Amazon controlled an estimated 75% of online trade book print sales in the U.S. at the time -- was far more punitive than just severing Macmillan's ties to the e-book market. Amazon had used this buy button removal tactic before to punish publishers in the U.S. and the U.K. who fail to fall in line with Amazon's business plans, but it had never done so as boldly or comprehensively.

Amazon blinked, perhaps after consulting with antitrust counsel. After a one-week blackout, Amazon and Macmillan came to terms, and Macmillan could sell e-books through Amazon using the agency model. Four of the other big six would come to terms with Amazon on the agency model. Random House, the largest trade publisher, has chosen not to use the agency model, for reasons we will describe in the future (hint: Stieg Larsson).

One Year Later

Barnes & Noble is, unexpectedly, the biggest beneficiary of Apple's entry into the e-book market. With five of the big six trade book publishers using the agency model, Barnes & Noble was able to enter the e-book market based largely on its customer relationships and on technological innovation, rather than on its willingness to burn through capital to subsidize book sales. Its share of the e-book market has grown rapidly over the past year, approaching 20% of trade sales. Its introduction of the Nook Color reportedly gave it a substantial lift over the holidays.

Barnes & Noble still finds itself subsidizing sales of Random House e-books -- it generally matches Amazon's price on those titles -- but those costs appear manageable. Barnes & Noble faces substantial challenges, as do all physical bookstores, as publishing moves to its partly digital future, but it appears to have regained its footing. Should the agency model ever collapse, however, Barnes & Noble could quickly find itself at Amazon's mercy. Amazon's growth and profitability continue to soar, and its appetite for out-discounting competitors at any cost appears undiminished.

In the meantime, Apple is not standing still. According to numerous, but conflicting, reports Apple may be revising the terms for booksellers using iPhone and iPad apps as e-readers. We will be watching these developments closely.

Tomorrow: The E-Royalty Debate

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